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Abstract
Economic challenges as a result of the 
recent fluctuations in oil prices have 
exposed unprecedented risks to Kuwait 
and the other Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states, including securing long-
term sustainable access to and use of 
water and food resources. The strong 
interlinkages between the availability of 
water, energy, and food resources have 
been termed the Water–Energy–Food 
(WEF) nexus. Here, we characterise the 
nexus for Kuwait across different spatial 
scales, reviewing available literature and 
focussing on empirical data from the most 
widely used global and regional databases 
on water, energy and food. While there 
are certainly issues of water scarcity, 
trade-offs between sectors at the domes-
tic level are limited. At the international 
scale, high oil export revenues shield 
Kuwait from the immediate impacts of 
higher prices in food imports, but they 
expose Kuwait to water scarcity and food 
production risks in other countries. At the 
global scale, we consider climate change 
mitigation linkages with Kuwait’s WEF 
nexus. Whilst there is great uncertainty 
about future international climate policy 
and its implications for oil and gas rev-
enues in Kuwait, our analysis illustrates 
how implementation of policy measures 
to account for the social costs of carbon 
could be significant.
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Water, Energy and Food Security in the Gulf Region
Despite the economic prosperity that Kuwait and the other Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states enjoy, economic challenges as a result of the recent fluctuations in oil prices 
have exposed unprecedented risks, including securing long-term sustainable access to and 
use of water and food resources. The GCC includes Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, and is characterised by a hyper-arid climate. These 
states rank among the lowest in the world in terms of freshwater resources and soil fertility, 
but among the highest in water, energy and food consumption, and emissions of green-
house gases (particularly CO2). In recent years, lower oil revenues have highlighted the 
vulnerability of GCC countries and their reliance on a single export product. Although some 
of the decline in net oil export revenue is a result of a decrease in production and exports, 
the decrease in crude oil prices accounted for most of the decline.1 This has led to signif-
icant budget deficits in recent years in several GCC states, including Kuwait, where the 
government’s deficit reached 16.5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016.2 
None of the GCC states is self-sufficient in food and water; all rely heavily on imports 
(food products and virtual water in food products) from other countries and seawater 
desalination to sustain their needs. Harsh climatic conditions and scarce water resources 
have been major impediments for the development of the agriculture and water sector. In 
Kuwait, with a current population of about 4 million, the total renewable water resources 
are as low as 5 m3/capita-year. In comparison, a country with renewable water reserves 
below 1000 m3/capita-year is considered ‘water scarce’ under widely used definitions. 
None of the GCC states have water resources greater than 500 m3/capita-year. To meet 
their freshwater needs, GCC states have developed into world leaders in the application 
of seawater desalination technology with an installed desalination capacity in 2012 of 18 
million m3 per day of freshwater in operation (planned to expand by 40 percent by 2020). 
Seawater desalination is, in turn, highly energy intensive and a costly process that requires 
2.6–8.5 kWh/m3 depending on the desalination technology used.3
Food security through conventional domestic agriculture has been deemed unsustain-
able and an unattainable goal due to environmental and water resource constraints.4 Any 
meaningful attempt to support domestic agricultural production is thus strongly depen-
dent on the availability of energy (i.e., burning more oil, and in the future possibly solar) 
to desalinate seawater for irrigation, using highly controlled environmental conditions in 
closed agricultural systems. Desalinated seawater and brackish groundwater have been 
1   ‘Country Analysis Brief: Kuwait’, US Energy Information Administration, EIA (2016). Available at https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=KWT (accessed 27 November 2019).
2   ‘CIA World Factbook’, CIA Public Library (n.d.). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/print_ku.html (accessed 27 November 2019).
3   ‘Renewable Energy in the Water, Energy, and Food Nexus’, International Renewable Energy Agency, 
IRENA (January 2015). Available at https://www.irena.org/publications/2015/Jan/Renewable-Energy-in-
the-Water-Energy--Food-Nexus (accessed 9 December 2019).
4   ‘FAOSTAT statistics database’, Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT (n.d). Available at http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/118 (accessed 9 December 2019).
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extensively used for supplemental irrigation in protected greenhouse production, which 
locally has contributed to soil salinisation,5 but the techniques are currently too expensive 
to be used for staple crops. GCC states therefore secure food resources by importing food 
from international markets, made possible by their ability to maintain their economic 
wealth through oil exports.
While oil export revenue has been decreasing, energy consumption of GCC residents has 
steadily increased. According to the World Bank, in 2014, five out of six GCC states were in 
the top 12 highest energy consumers on a per capita basis, with Kuwait the world’s seventh 
highest. Kuwait’s average consumption of 14.9 MWh/capita is equivalent to 9,708 kg/capita 
of oil per year.6 About 34 percent of the national energy is generated using natural gas fuel 
which Kuwait started importing a few years ago to cope with peak electricity demands, 
while the remainder is generated using crude oil. Insufficient domestic production and 
imports of natural gas to meet peak electricity demand in the summer months have 
resulted in frequent blackouts and led to the power sector relying on more expensive 
heavy fuel oil and crude oil to generate electricity. 
The deep interlinkages between the availability of water, energy, and food resources have 
been termed the Water–Energy–Food (WEF) nexus. The term WEF nexus describes 
interdependencies and the way activities and/or policies in one sector affect others (see 
Figure 1, modified for the Middle East and Kuwait contexts). At the core of nexus debates 
are natural resources scarcities and the recognition that water, energy, food and other 
resources are interlinked, with resource use and availability being interdependent.7 As 
a result of these interdependencies, decision-makers face the significant challenge of 
accounting for synergies and potential trade-offs between water, energy, food and the 
environment at multiple spatial and temporal scales.8 A nexus approach can help focus 
on increasing resource use efficiency by seeking to maximise the benefits of the scarcest 
resource and through cooperation produce cross-sector benefits.9 
5   ‘AQUASTAT statistics database’, Food and Agriculture Organization, AQUASTAT. (n.d.). Available at 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/KWT (accessed 9 December 2019).
6   ‘World Bank Database’, World Bank. (n.d.). Available at https://data.worldbank.org/country/kuwait 
(accessed 9 December 2019).
7   Mairi Dupar and Naomi Oates, ‘Getting to grips with the Water–Energy–Food “nexus”’, Climate and 
Development Knowledge Network (2012). Available at https://cdkn.org/2012/04/getting-to-grips-with-the-
water-energy-food-nexus (accessed 10 July 2015); Hayley Leck, Declan Conway, Michael Bradshaw 
and Judith Rees, ‘Tracing the water–energy–food nexus: description, theory and practice’, Geography 
Compass 9/8 (2015), pp. 445–60.
8   Mark Howells and H-Holger Rogner, ‘Water-energy nexus: Assessing integrated systems’, Nature 
Climate Change 4/4 (2014), p. 246; Jianguo Liu et al., ‘Systems integration for global sustainability’, Science 
347/6225 (2015).
9   Claudi Ringler, Anik Bhaduri and R. Lawford, ‘The nexus across water, energy, land and food (WELF): 
potential for improved resource use efficiency?’, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 5/6 
(2013), pp. 617–24.
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Figure 1. Modified version of the nexus framework of Conway et al.,10 based on 
Hoff,11 integrating global drivers with fields of action related to the GCC.12
Aims and Methodology
The aims of this working paper are to; (1) investigate existing approaches to assess the 
WEF nexus and their relevance for understanding the nexus in Kuwait and the GCC; (2) 
highlight the unique characteristics of the nexus in the GCC; and (3) characterise in a 
quantitative fashion the WEF nexus for Kuwait.
10   Declan Conway et al., ‘Climate and southern Africa’s Water–Energy–Food nexus’, Nature Climate 
Change 5/9 (2015), pp. 837–46.
11   Holger Hoff, ‘Understanding the nexus. background paper for the Bonn2011 Conference: the water, 
energy and food security nexus’, Stockholm Environment Institute (Stockholm, 2011).
12  Here, important drivers are global demand, price of oil and prices of other imported commodities. 
This is considered as a specific ‘trade scale’ in our analysis. GCC climate drivers are, for example, pro-
longed heat waves affecting energy usage and water demand. 
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Results are based on a literature review of 26 review and conceptual papers, out of a total 
sample of 473, expanded with both peer reviewed and grey literature on the Gulf and, to 
cast the net wider, the Middle East (n=22). To quantify Kuwait’s nexus, global and regional 
datasets such as UNComtrade, Aquastat and the IEA World Summary Energy Balance 
were complemented with national reports on resource use.
To date, nexus interlinkages have been poorly characterised for the GCC states; one likely 
reason being the abundance of oil which obscures any shortages in other sectors. As a 
result, there exist significant knowledge gaps in the way the WEF nexus of each state in 
the GCC is domestically dependent on its economic performance, regionally interdepen-
dent on each other’s WEF nexus and globally affected by the impact of climate variability 
and change on the world’s food producers. A more detailed assessment of trade-offs and 
synergies could highlight opportunities for more sustainable resource use. 
A New Paradigm: The Water–Energy–Food Nexus
In recent years, the WEF nexus concept has become a dominant framework to assess 
resource use, scarcity and interconnectedness. With its roots in the debate of the 1970s on 
‘The Limits to Growth’, the nexus concept has gained traction after a major WEF nexus 
conference in 2011 in Bonn adding new momentum to earlier debates on resource scarcity. 
In parallel, the Planetary Boundaries framework emerged,13 which puts resource scarcity 
in a global perspective by proposing quantitative global limits to the anthropogenic per-
turbation of crucial Earth system processes. While the Planetary Boundaries concept is 
not mentioned explicitly in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development goals (SDGs), 
all nine of its system processes are addressed in the SDGs in some way, either as the focus 
of a goal or included in specific targets.14 Where Planetary Boundaries set the thresholds 
that should not be exceeded for a ‘planetary safe operating space’ and SDGs prioritise and 
set ambition levels starting from the global level, the nexus concept specifically addresses 
the trade-offs and synergies that arise at the more regional and domestic levels. Generally, 
there is no one global definition of the nexus. It can be seen as an analytical approach, 
a governance framework or a discourse.15 And while the conceptual debate on the nexus 
advances, its quantification and application as a management and decision-making tool 
are still in their early stages. 
Which elements best describe the nexus and where to draw its boundaries are still topics 
of discussion. Many approaches and reviews on quantification of the nexus synthesise 
results for linkages in two sectors, i.e. water–energy, energy–food etc (see Figure 2).
13   Johan Rockström et al., ‘Planetary boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity’. 
Ecology and Society 14/2 (2009), p. 32.
14   Tiina Häyhä, et al., ‘From Planetary Boundaries to national fair shares of the global safe operating 
space — How can the scales be bridged?’, Global Environmental Change 40 (2016), pp. 60–72.
15   Marko Keskinen et al., ‘The Water–Energy–Food Nexus and the Transboundary Context: Insights from 
Large Asian Rivers’, Water 8/5 (2016).
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Albrecht et al.16 found from 245 papers reviewed, only a few examples of more holistic 
methods analysing a nexus of more than two elements, like the ‘Water–Energy–Food 
nexus’. While the term ‘Water–Energy–Food nexus’ has by far received the most attention 
and traction, alternative versions of nexus sectors notably include climate change, land 
and soil, or water quality aspects. Allan adds the WASH supply chain (water and sewage 
services) to the nexus.17 Several studies caution that terrestrial–marine linkages are often 
overlooked,18 which can be important, since coastal ecosystems and fisheries are influ-
enced by flows of nutrients, sediment and salt. Especially the latter, the link between 
desalination, climate change and increased salinity in the Gulf, gets increased attention.
Figure 2. Development of interest in the nexus, based on count of publications per 
year (SCOPUS)
16   Tamee A. Albrecht, Arica Crootof and Christopher A. Scott, ‘The Water–Energy–Food nexus: A com-
prehensive review of nexus-specific methods’, Environmental Research Letters (2018).
17   Tony Allan, ‘Water, Food and Trade as an Element of the Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the MENA 
Region’, in Adnan Badran et al. (eds), Water, Energy & Food Sustainability in the Middle East - The Sustain-
ability Triangle (Springer, 2017), pp. 45–56.
18   Aiko Endo et al., ‘A review of the current state of research on the water, energy, and food nexus’, 
Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies 11 (2017), pp. 20–30.
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Broader scales beyond Water–Energy–Food have also been identified. Allan, Keulertz and 
Woertz19 describe the conceptual emergence of the nexus along the lines of two ‘sub-nex-
uses’ on water–food–trade and energy–climate change, merging into the ‘grand nexus’ 
of Water–Energy–Food, in which the proportions of energy and water used in different 
economic sectors across the globe, in regions or for individual countries, could be iden-
tified. Key differences between these two sub-nexuses are their supply chains and the 
type of stakeholders involved: smallholder farmers are often central in the water–food–
trade nexus while big oil companies dominate the energy–climate change nexus. To fully 
consider energy requires quantifying not only energy consumption or supply, but also 
the CO2 emissions generated.20 Some studies include climate as a separate, fourth nexus 
element21 and some also model its impacts on the WEF nexus.22 
A number of review studies are motivated by the question of the nexus’ added value. 
They find the nexus approach driven by increasing competition for resources and rising 
scarcity, which intensifies resource linkages.23 Other explanations for adoption of nexus 
approaches include the insufficiency of single sector-focused resource management strat-
egies.24 Comparing a nexus with non-nexus approaches using linear optimisation, a study 
by El-Gafy et al.25 finds that considering the full nexus leads to better cropping pattern 
results than policies focused on one sector only. Increasingly WEF nexus goals are linked 
to the SDGs,26 adding value by linking to major policy processes. 
With regards to its integrative power, many place the nexus approach in the tradition of 
other integration approaches such as Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), 
which – as its name suggests – was primarily water-centred. Some are critical, seeing the 
nexus approach as a mere continuation of the formerly failed IWRM paradigm.27 However, 
19   Tony Allan, Martin Keulertz and Art Woertz, The water–food–energy nexus: an introduction to nexus 
concepts and some conceptual and operational problems (Taylor & Francis, 2015).
20   Andre Daccache, et al., ‘Water and energy footprint of irrigated agriculture in the Mediterranean 
region’, Environmental Research Letters 9/12 (2014).
21   Caroline King and Hadi Jaafar, ‘Rapid assessment of the water–energy–food–climate nexus in six 
selected basins of North Africa and West Asia undergoing transitions and scarcity threats’, International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 31/3 (2015), pp. 343–59.
22   Yi-Chen Ethan Yang et al., ‘Modeling the Agricultural Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the Indus River 
Basin, Pakistan’, Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 142/12 (2016).
23   Mohammad Al-Saidi and Nadir Ahmed Elagib, ‘Towards understanding the integrative approach of 
the water, energy and food nexus’, Sci Total Environ 574 (2017), pp. 1131–39.
24   Mike Muller, ‘The “Nexus” as a Step Back towards a More Coherent Water Resource Management 
Paradigm’, Water Alternatives 8/1 (2015), p. 20.
25   Inas El-Gafy, Neil Grigg and Reagan Waskom, ‘Water-Food-Energy: Nexus and Non-Nexus Approaches 
for Optimal Cropping Pattern’, Water Resources Management 31/15 (2017), pp. 4971–80.
26   Holger Schlör, Jürgen-Friedrich Hake and Sandra Venghaus, ‘An Integrated Assessment Model for the 
German Food-Energy-Water Nexus’, Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water and Environ-
ment Systems 6/1 (2017), pp. 1–12; Carlo Giupponi and Animesh Gain, ‘Integrated spatial assessment of 
the water, energy and food dimensions of the Sustainable Development Goals’, Regional Environmental 
Change 17/7 (2016), pp. 1881–93.
27   Dennis Wichelns, ‘The Water–Energy–Food nexus: Is the increasing attention warranted, from either 
a research or policy perspective?’, Environmental Science & Policy 69 (2017), pp. 113–23.
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most studies do acknowledge the clarity of the nexus approach when it comes to bound-
aries of integration.28 In the GCC, and specifically in Kuwait, IWRM has probably had 
less appeal due to the provision of water being more a technical water supply and reuse 
challenge rather than a resource management issue. Framing water challenges alongside 
energy and food challenges opens up new perspectives on sustainability.
Understanding the Nexus Concept in the Gulf Region
The low number of nexus studies focusing on the Middle East highlights the limited 
development of the nexus concept for the region. Allan29 states that the nexus concept is 
not yet widely used for the Middle East region (or elsewhere) and that it needs to be effec-
tively linked to market systems and supply chains to provide greater analytical strength. 
As regards the energy component of the nexus, oil naturally plays an important role 
in the region and especially in the Gulf states. Focus on the nexus has been primarily 
food and water driven, though, which can be explained by the fact that those are the 
region’s two major scarce resources. For Saudi Arabia, Grindle et al.30 present data on 
the water embedded in different agricultural products. They highlight that energy use for 
agricultural production via water would increase dramatically when shifting from ground-
water pumping to desalination or brackish water, as treatment of water would be much 
more energy intensive. Siddiqi et al.31 illustrate the water requirements of oil production 
and energy generation, as well as the energy need for water pumping and desalination. 
Keulertz and Woertz explicitly address the importance that the energy exports had for 
directing GCC countries towards food imports as an alternative to improving their water, 
energy and food resource management.32 With energy (such as diesel oil) being such an 
important cost for producing food in many agricultural systems globally33 and thereby an 
important factor in the price of food commodities, this creates an interesting feedback 
between the GCC states’ oil exports and their food imports. 
A general observation is that the trade scale of the nexus, mainly in the form of virtual 
water as a solution to nexus challenges, is more pronounced and important in the Middle 
28   Ximing Cai et al., ‘Understanding and managing the food-energy-water nexus – opportunities for 
water resources research’, Advances in Water Resources 111 (2018), pp. 259–73.
29   Allan, ‘Water, Food and Trade as an Element of the Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the MENA Region’.
30   Arani Kajenthira Grindle, Afreen Siddiqi and Laura Diaz Anadon, ‘Food security amidst water scarcity: 
Insights on sustainable food production from Saudi Arabia’, Sustainable Production and Consumption 2 
(2015), pp. 67–78.
31   Afreen Siddiqi and Laura Diaz Anadon, ‘The water–energy nexus in Middle East and North Africa’, 
Energy Policy 39/2 (2011), pp. 4529–40.
32   Martin Keulertz and Eckart Woertz, ‘Financial challenges of the nexus: pathways for investment in 
water, energy and agriculture in the Arab world’, International Journal of Water Resources Development 31/3 
(2015), pp. 312–25.
33   Morgan Bazilian et al., ‘Considering the energy, water and food nexus: Towards an integrated model-
ling approach’, Energy Policy 39/12 (2011), pp. 7896–906.
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East sample compared to the general WEF nexus literature.34 This can be explained with 
the relative importance of agricultural imports for the region and the severe water scarcity 
many Middle Eastern countries already face. Grindle et al.35 approach virtual water from an 
agricultural perspective, looking at virtual water embedded in food trade. They compare 
food trade and virtual water imports with direct foreign investment in land for agricultural 
development, which they see as promising for optimising sustainability of global food 
production, but also as a potential source of conflict. A more complete picture of virtual 
water in the Middle East region is presented by Antonelli and Tamea,36 who use FAOSTAT 
data to analyse historic trade over a 25-year period for 309 products and calculate their 
virtual water content based on a global assessment for the water content of commodities.37 
They distinguish between green and blue virtual water38 and find that green water imports 
are especially important for the Middle East region in the form of food commodities, 
whereas virtual water exports from Middle East countries contain important amounts 
of blue water. This study also looks at virtual water through an agriculture lens, largely 
neglecting the energy use associated with virtual water. 
Climate can affect both availability and demand for resources and it will impact Kuwait 
and the GCC directly and indirectly; through continued warming and through the effects of 
action on global mitigation. Attempts to reduce climate emissions in order to achieve the 
ambitions to combat climate change as expressed in the Paris Agreement or to account for 
the social cost of carbon will influence demand for oil – or its price. This is likely to have 
a strong influence on synergies and trade-offs in the WEF nexus in the GCC. Apart from 
some mention of possible impacts on resource availability in the Gulf, especially water,39 
we did not find any Middle East nexus study explicitly addressing this climate mitigation 
34   Allan, ‘Water, Food and Trade as an Element of the Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the MENA Region’; 
Kajenthira et al., ‘Food security amidst water scarcity’; Marta Antonelli and Stefania Tamea, ‘Food-wa-
ter security and virtual water trade in the Middle East and North Africa’, International Journal of Water 
Resources Development, 31/3 (2015), pp. 326–42.
35   Grindle et al., ‘Food security amidst water scarcity’.
36   Antonelli and Tamea, ‘Food-water security and virtual water trade in the Middle East and North 
Africa’.
37   Mesfin Mekonnen and Arjen Ysbert Hoekstra, ‘The green, blue and grey water footprint of farm 
animals and animal products’, UNESCO-IHE Institute for water Education Delft (2010); Mesfin Mekon-
nen and Arjen Ysbert Hoekstra, ‘The green, blue and grey water footprint of crops and derived crop 
products’, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 15/5 (2011), pp. 1577–600.
38   Green water originates from precipitation, stored in the root zone of the soil and evaporated, trans-
pired or incorporated by plants. It is particularly relevant for agricultural, horticultural and forestry 
products. Blue water has been sourced from surface or groundwater resources. It can be evaporated, 
transpired or incorporated by plants, but part will be returned to a (ground)water body at a different 
time. Irrigated agriculture, industry and domestic water use can each have a blue water footprint.
39   Allan, ‘Water, Food and Trade as an Element of the Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the MENA Region’; 
Rana El Hajj et al., ‘Enhancing regional cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa through the 
Water–Energy–Food Security Nexus’, Policy Brief (2017), pp. 331–40; Peter Rogers, ‘The Triangle: Energy, 
Water & Food Nexus for Sustainable Security in the Arab Middle East’, in Adnan Badran et al. (eds), 
Water, Energy & Food Sustainability in the Middle East - The Sustainability Triangle (New York: Springer 
International Publishing, 2017), pp. 21–44.
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component. Swain and Jägerskog touch upon it,40 placing climate change impacts in a 
broader security perspective, and address the risks from shifts in the global supply of 
oil and gas (i.e. new gas explorations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere) and how this 
might threaten the income sources that most of the Gulf states currently rely on. However, 
they do not make a direct connection between climate mitigation and the search for alter-
native renewable sources of energy. 
In comparison with the main empirical sample analysed, methodologies applied to the 
nexus in the Middle East use relatively more qualitative approaches and discuss the nexus 
conceptually.41 Regarding the use of data, the Middle East literature sample contains 
few studies that use time-series data beyond the merely descriptive. Where quantitative 
methods are applied, it is often a simple quantification of two sector linkages.42 Descrip-
tive reports summarising available data43 and results of conferences are also presented,44 
which provide insights on the current nexus debates in the Middle East region. More elab-
orate quantitative analyses include a life cycle analysis (LCA) model,45 which is based on 
several sub-system life cycle inventory (LCI) models. Grindle et al. use a water footprint 
approach with energy input analysis, combined with assessments of virtual water trade 
and foreign direct investment for food production.46 The WEF Nexus Tool 2.0 has been 
developed as a scenario-based, integrated framework and applied to Qatar.47 
40   Ashok Swain and Andres Jägerskog, Emerging security threats in the Middle East: the impact of climate 
change and globalisation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
41   Allan, ‘Water, Food and Trade as an Element of the Water–Energy–Food Nexus in the MENA Region’; 
King and Jaafar, ‘Rapid assessment of the water–energy–food–climate nexus in six selected basins of 
North Africa and West Asia undergoing transitions and scarcity threats’; Keulertz and Woertz, ‘Financial 
challenges of the nexus’; Rogers, ‘The Triangle’; Aysegül Kibaroglu and Sezin Iba Gürsoy, ‘Water–
energy–food nexus in a transboundary context: the Euphrates–Tigris river basin as a case study’, Water 
International 40/5-6 (2015), pp. 824–38; Najmedin Meshkati et al., ‘People-Technology-Ecosystem Inte-
gration: A Framework to Ensure Regional Interoperability for Safety, Sustainability, and Resilience of 
Interdependent Energy, Water, and Seafood Sources in the (Persian) Gulf ’, Hum Factors 58/1 (2016), pp. 
43–57; Nadim Farajalla, Patricia Haydamous and Rana El Hajj, ‘Water, Energy, Food Nexus: An outlook 
on public institutions in Lebanon’, AUB Policy Institute (2016).
42   Siddiqi and Anadon, ‘The water–energy nexus in Middle East and North Africa’; Samer Talozi, Yasmeen 
Al Sakaji and Amelia Altz-Stamm, ‘Towards a water–energy–food nexus policy: realising the blue and 
green virtual water of agriculture in Jordan’, International Journal of Water Resources Development 31/3 
(2015), pp. 461–82.
43   Maria Martens, ‘Food and Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa’, NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly Special Report (2017).
44   Thinesh Kumar Paramasilvam, ‘Report: Emerging issues facing the water–energy–food nexus in the 
Middle East and Asia’, International Journal of Water Resources Development 32/6 (2016), pp. 1016–9; 
‘Emerging Issues Facing the Water- Energy-Food Nexus in the Middle East and Asia’, King Abdullah 
Petroleum Studies and Research Center (2016); ‘Dialogue Snapshot - The Water Energy Food Nexus: An 
Integrated Approach to the Middle East Water Challenge’, The Holling Centre (2016).
45   Tareq Al-Ansari et al., ‘Integration of greenhouse gas control technologies within the energy, water and 
food nexus to enhance the environmental performance of food production systems’, Journal of Cleaner 
Production 162 (2017), pp. 1592–606; Tareq Al-Ansari, ‘Development of the Energy, Water and Food 
Nexus Systems Model in Department of Earth Science and Engineering’, Imperial College London (2016).
46   Grindle et al., ‘Food security amidst water scarcity’.
47   Bassel T. Daher and Rabi H. Mohtar, ‘Water–energy–food (WEF) Nexus Tool 2.0: guiding integrative 
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Our review suggests that preferences and economic decision-making processes need to 
be more adequately represented in models and approaches.48 Incorporating stakeholders’ 
decisions and human behaviour in models is a major challenge.49 In process systems engi-
neering, multi-stakeholder models have been developed to address this problem, often 
using game-theoretic approaches.50 For energy systems’ impacts on water consumption 
and food production, Bieber et al. develop and apply an agent-based model, which does 
incorporate human behaviour and decisions.51 In this context, the distinctive character of 
Kuwait’s political economy as a ‘super rentier state’,52 where the economy relies predom-
inantly on rents from oil extraction and both taxation and political representation are 
largely absent, needs to be recognised as it strongly determines nexus resource allocations 
within sectors and society, and skew the political economy of decision-making.53 The role 
of resource subsidies in the social contract (cheap water, energy and food) in legitimis-
ing non-democratic governance constrains the political incentives and decision-making 
space for WEF choices. 
Finally, institutional and governance aspects of the nexus remain under-researched,54 
even though many studies highlight the need for such research.55 Calls to better connect 
the results of nexus assessments to policy goals, for instance the SDGs,56 are beginning to 
appear.57 An interesting observation is that governance and policy seem to receive more 
attention in the Middle East nexus literature compared to the global sample. A range of 
studies discusses geopolitical implications and regional security issues,58 political rela-
tions between countries and stakeholders,59 the local context of the nexus60 and the 
resource planning and decision-making’, Water International 40/5-6 (2015), pp. 748–71.
48   Catherine L. Kling et al., ‘Integrated Assessment Models of the Food, Energy, and Water Nexus: A 
Review and an Outline of Research Needs’, Annual Review of Resource Economics 9 (2017), p. 21.
49   Paul Faeth and Lars Hanson, ‘A research agenda for the energy, water, land, and climate nexus’, Journal 
of Environmental Studies and Sciences 6/1 (2016), pp. 123–6.
50   Daniel J. Garcia and Fengqi You, ‘The Water–Energy–Food nexus and process systems engineering: A 
new focus’, Computers & Chemical Engineering 91 (2016), pp. 49–67.
51   Niclas Bieber et al., ‘Sustainable planning of the energy-water-food nexus using decision making 
tools’, Energy Policy 113 (2018), pp. 584–607.
52   Courtney Freer, Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
53   Ibid. 
54   Valeria Jana Schwanitz, August Hubert Wierling and Payal Shah, ‘Assessing the Impact of Renewable 
Energy on Regional Sustainability—A Comparative Study of Sogn og Fjordane (Norway) and Okinawa 
(Japan)’, Sustainability 9/11 (2017).
55   AJ Veldhuis and Aydong Yang, ‘Integrated approaches to the optimisation of regional and local food–
energy–water systems’, Current Opinion in Chemical Engineering 18 (2017), pp. 38–44.
56   Carey King and Michael Carbajales-Dale, ‘Food–energy–water metrics across scales: project to system 
level’, Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 6/1 (2016), pp. 39–49.
57   Schlör et al., ‘An Integrated Assessment Model for the German Food-Energy-Water Nexus’; Giupponi 
and Gain, ‘Integrated spatial assessment of the water, energy and food dimensions of the Sustainable 
Development Goals’.
58   Keulertz and Woertz, ‘Financial challenges of the nexus’; Swain and Jägerskog, Emerging security 
threats in the Middle East.
59   Kibaroglu and Gürsoy, ‘Water–energy–food nexus in a transboundary context’.
60   Meshkati et al., ‘People-Technology-Ecosystem Integration’; Talozi et al., ‘Towards a water–energy–
food nexus policy’.
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need for stakeholder consultation.61 Particularly comprehensive is the governance anal-
ysis for the whole Arab region conducted by Chnais et al.62 They qualitatively analyse 
the institutional landscape that governs the nexus at the national and regional scales in 
Arab countries and identify challenges and opportunities. The findings largely reflect the 
general governance trends also detected in the global sample on the nexus; a multitude 
of institutions are responsible for managing (parts of) the nexus in Arab countries, with 
so far little cooperation and overlapping competencies, as well as silo thinking. These 
issues could be addressed through existing regional consultation mechanisms or collab-
orations, for instance in the water sector, to advance nexus thinking and implementation. 
In a policy paper El Hajj et al. build on this analysis and recommend a set of actions to 
improve regional cooperation on the nexus, for instance through increased knowledge 
building and sharing, private sector mobilisation for financing, and integration of existing 
institutions.63 More fundamental shortcomings, for instance in the form of many vacant 
positions in departments and lengthy administrative procedures remain barriers to inte-
gration. The social welfare, public sector employment and other rentier benefits that skew 
the political economy of decision-making in Kuwait, as in the other Gulf states, create very 
specific conditions for WEF stakeholder consultation. 
Water–Energy–Food Nexus for Kuwait
We illustrate the nexus for Kuwait below, at three scales: the domestic nexus; the interna-
tional nexus, with exports and imports adding an extra scale of analysis that links Kuwait’s 
nexus to those in the countries it imports from; and, finally the global scale, by adding a 
climate change mitigation angle to Kuwait’s nexus. 
One common problem with quantifying the nexus, and with many nexus studies, is that 
the sectors are measured in different and, to some extent, non-commensurate units and 
are therefore rarely compared directly. To address this issue, we convert and present the 
nexus flows in comparable units – barrel of oil equivalents (BOEs).64 For some linkages 
that cannot be expressed in BOE, their relative importance is presented (see Figure 3). 
Values presented relate to the 1992–2015 period.
61   King and Jaafar, ‘Rapid assessment of the water–energy–food–climate nexus in six selected basins of 
North Africa and West Asia undergoing transitions and scarcity threats’.
62   Elie Chnais, Nadim Farajalla and Rana El Hajj, ‘Water, Energy, Food Nexus: An outlook on public 
institutions in the Arab World’, AUB Policy Institute (2016).
63   El Hajj et al., ‘Enhancing regional cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa through the Water–
Energy–Food Security Nexus’.
64   The barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) is a unit of energy based on the approximate energy released by 
burning one barrel (42 US gallons or 159 litres) of crude oil.
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The Domestic WEF Nexus
Kuwait is the world’s 7th highest energy consumer on a per capita basis and has a consid-
erable total domestic energy use of 91 million BOE (mBOE), with energy use for water 
– mostly through desalination and a fraction used to pump groundwater or treat wastewa-
ter – requiring a significant amount (10 mBOE, against 81 mBOE for other uses). Cooling 
and electricity are other important energy users, at 21 mBOE, about 20 percent of total 
domestic energy use. Considerably less energy is used for food production, here approx-
imated by the energy requirements for groundwater pumping (0.2 mBOE) and treating 
wastewater (0.1 mBOE) (ignoring any fuel cost for machinery or cooling costs of green-
houses), reflecting the small domestic agricultural sector. 
Figure 3. Kuwait’s domestic WEF nexus, with numbers representing mBOE
There is no conflict between land used for food production and that used for water har-
vesting or energy generation. The production of biofuels, an important cause of trade-offs 
between food and energy production elsewhere, is non-existent in Kuwait. Using land to 
harvest water is equally rare in Kuwait’s desert, where only a few wadis fill temporarily 
after rains in winter and spring. Above all, with its hyper-arid climate and sandy soils, 
there is hardly any land suitable for food production to compete with in the first place. 
Specialised production in greenhouses and tree crops like date palms requires relatively 
little space.
With rainfall almost absent, annual renewable water resources are minimal, mostly con-
sisting of groundwater inflow from Saudi Arabia, estimated at about 20 million cubic 
81
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meter (MCM)65 to 45 MCM per year.66 Whilst agricultural production is limited, and only 
a relatively small volume of water is used for food production, this still amounts to an 
estimated 200–500 MCM per year, mainly irrigation from brackish groundwater and reuse 
of wastewater. Agriculture represents more than a third of all water use, with domestic 
use and the oil production industry being the other main consumers, and its groundwater 
extraction exceeds the aquifer’s capacity.67 Net water use estimates for the oil sector are 
rare (the sector is generally ignored in scientific papers or official documents discussing 
Kuwait’s water demand), but using water use per barrel of oil intensity estimates from the 
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research68 and research by Siddiqi and Anadon,69 a range 
of 30 MCM to 200 MCM per year is derived, part groundwater, part seawater and with 
an unknown part recycled. With the aging of oil fields, more water is needed to extract 
oil through enhanced recovery processes, which is a reason for concern. Most cooling of 
thermal power plants is done using seawater.70 Domestic drinking water demand is almost 
fully met by seawater desalination. While renewable water resources are obviously very 
limited in Kuwait, there is clearly a challenge to use less and reuse more, but overall nexus 
trade-offs between sectors are limited.
International Trade Dominates Kuwait’s WEF Nexus
More important is Kuwait’s international nexus, with limited domestic food production 
compensated by imports and financed by oil (i.e. energy) exports (see Figure 4). At 710 
mBOE the exports dominate the nexus. Food imports represent a value of 35 mBOE (cal-
culated by converting the amount of food imported, and its price, into oil equivalent); 
which at 4 percent of total oil export revenue is relatively small. In years with low oil and 
high food prices, however, the food import–oil export proportion increases, reaching 8 
percent in 2014. 
Imported food requires land, water, energy and nutrient resources in other parts of the 
world. The reliability of food imports, and their price, will depend to some extent on 
sustainable management of these resources. Importing food thereby means exposure to 
nexus trade-offs elsewhere. The sustainable use of water, and the amount of embedded 
water, also called ‘virtual water’, has lately received increasing attention. About 90 percent 
of Kuwait’s rice imports come from India (2015 values),71 a country that has abundant 
water resources seasonally, but that suffers from declining groundwater levels due to over 
65   AQUASTAT statistics database, Food and Agriculture Organization.
66   Amr Fadlelmawla and Muhammad Al-otaibi, ‘Analysis of the Water Resources Status in Kuwait’, Water 
Resources Management 19/5 (2005), pp. 555–70.
67   Ibid. 
68   Pers. Com. KISR – Petroleum Research Center, estimating about 1/6 of a barrel of water for each 
barrel of oil produced. Part seawater, part recycled, with amounts increasing when going to enhanced 
oil recovery practices.
69   Siddiqi and Anadon, ‘The water–energy nexus in Middle East and North Africa’.
70   Ibid.
71  Based on UN COMTRADE, visualised by https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/
import/kwt/show/1006/2016/ (accessed 9 December 2019).
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abstraction especially in rice growing such as the Punjab. With increasing competition 
for water from industry and households, greater stress and nexus trade-offs should be 
expected in Pakistan and India, and elsewhere. Wheat is mainly imported from Australia 
and Canada, two countries with – in normal years – a large food surplus from crops grown 
mainly under rainfed conditions. Threats to imports from nexus trade-offs play less of a 
role here, though changes in global demand – i.e. reduced production elsewhere – might 
still affect prices. Vegetables are imported from a variety of places, from India to the Neth-
erlands, limiting exposure. The most important meat and dairy import is poultry, with 
almost 80 percent of poultry meat coming from Brazil, a country with abundant land and 
water resources, but also strong nexus trade-offs between using land for food production, 
biofuels and maintaining essential ecosystems services of the Amazon forests and sur-
rounding areas. 
The international nexus highlights resource interdependencies, which play out both 
inwards, as a domestic challenge for Kuwait (e.g. an increasing part of the budget is spent 
on food imports) and outwards, affecting sustainable use of resources in source countries. 
The outward impact should be nuanced, though, and goes beyond the direct impact on 
the nexus in exporting countries. Exports to the Middle East provide valuable foreign 
currency for poorer countries that have sovereignty in choosing with whom to trade. The 
most severe impacts of any shock to the nexus in exporting countries (or global prices) 
are more likely felt in low/middle income countries reliant on imports, where rising food 
import prices directly translate into higher costs (proportion of income) for consumers. 
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Figure 4. International scale of the WEF nexus, with units expressed in barrel of oil 
equivalent (BOE). One depicted barrel is 1 mBOE.
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Adding Climate Change to the Nexus: The Social Cost of Carbon
A third scale links Kuwait’s nexus to the global, via climate change mitigation efforts. Emis-
sions from burning fossil fuels are contributing to rising temperatures globally, affecting 
weather patterns and the environment. This is expected to lead to a wide range of negative 
impacts, as summarised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC).72 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) tries to account for the costs of these impacts. Using 
common estimates on the cost of impacts and the emissions from a barrel of oil73 sug-
gests that the social cost of carbon should be $42 (per ton CO2) at 5 percent discount 
rate, representing 30 percent of the current price of a barrel of oil (see Figure 5). Much 
higher estimates of the SCC exist.74 Society will still be willing to accept some of these 
costs because of the benefits of burning fossil fuels, while other will have to be accepted 
because of the difficulty of reducing emissions rapidly (i.e. we are committed to impacts). 
In addition, in the future, increasing amounts of atmospheric CO2 might be sequestrated 
by combining bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), either through engi-
neering solutions or reforestation. This will limit social costs and allow greater exploitation 
of the fossil fuel resource base globally. An alternative estimate of the price of carbon is 
based on the notion of a limited total carbon emission budget still left under a maximum 
acceptable temperature rise, currently agreed at 2 °C above the pre-industrial mean;75 this 
gives the marginal costs of keeping global warming below this level. Assessing a range of 
modelled scenarios, a median price of $31/tCO2 in 2020 was reported by Dietz et al.76 A 
more ambitious maximum 1.5 °C temperature level,77 considered safer, would raise this 
price to $105/tCO2, with another model intercomparison suggesting a median carbon 
72   ‘IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Volume 2 (Energy)’, Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) (Switzerland, 2006). Available at https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/pub-
lic/2006gl/vol2.html (accessed 23 November 2019).
73   Among the state-of-the-art contemporary estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) are those 
calculated by the US Environmental Protection Agency. The latest figures equal to $12, $42 and $62 per 
tCO2 emitted in 2020 for 5, 3 and 2.5 percent discount rates, respectively. See Ricke et al, ‘Country-level 
social cost of carbon’. Carbon dioxide emissions per barrel of crude oil are determined by multiplying 
heat content times the carbon coefficient, times the fraction oxidised, times the ratio of the molecular 
weight of carbon dioxide to that of carbon. The average heat content of crude oil is 5.80 Metric Million 
British thermal unit (MMBtu) per barrel. The average carbon coefficient of crude oil is 20.31 kg carbon 
per MMBtu (EPA 2017). The fraction oxidised is 100 percent. This gives 0.43 metric tons CO2/barrel. 
Taking the lower discount rate of 2.5 percent then gives a social costs of $27 per barrel. At an average 
price of oil of $61 per barrel, this means SSC is 43 percent of the price per barrel. See ‘Inventory of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2015, Annex 2, Table A-40 and Table A-49’, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPT) (Washington, DC, 2017). Available at https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2015 (accessed 23 November 2019).
74   Katharine Ricke et al., ‘Country-level social cost of carbon’, Nature Climate Change 8/10 (2018), p. 895.
75  ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 
December 2009’, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (2010).
76   Simon Dietz et al., ‘The Economics of 1.5 °C Climate Change’, Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources 43/1 (2018), pp. 455–80.
77   ‘The Paris Agreement’, United Nations (2015). Available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_
paris_agreement.pdf (accessed 9 December 2019).
Siderius et al. 21 
price in the same order,78 of $137/tCO2 in 2030. However, the price of carbon will not be 
constant; it needs to rise steeply to drive further mitigation and maintain temperatures 
within both 2 °C and 1.5 °C.79
Figure 5. Same as Figure 4, but depicting the marginal cost of carbon as a fraction 
of oil export revenues, with in lightest grey an estimate of the marginal cost of car-
bon (in 2020) to keep global temperature increase below 2 oC and in dark grey the 
additional costs estimated for a 1.5 oC target.80 
78   Joeri Rogelj et al., ‘Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5 
°C’, Nature Climate Change, 5/6 (2015), p. 519.
79   Dietz et al., ‘The Economics of 1.5 °C Climate Change’.
80   Ibid.
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With global progress on international commitments to reduce fossil fuel use slow, and 
carbon prices still very low in those countries that have implemented emission trading 
schemes, the comparison in Figure 5 is primarily illustrative. Moreover, a price on carbon 
cannot be translated one-to-one into a future reduction in revenues as demand is not 
fully elastic. Reduced demand will not impact producers equally; Kuwait for example 
has a comparative cost advantage, with large reserves easily exploitable. Any reduction 
in demand is likely to first reduce production from more costly sources, like Canada’s 
tar sands, or limit expensive new exploration, like in the arctic. McGlade and Ekins have 
looked at the remaining ultimately recoverable resources, when countries would commit 
to a 2 °C maximum increase in temperature above pre-industrial levels.81 Globally, over 
430 billion barrels of oil and 95 trillion cubic metres of gas currently classified as reserves 
should remain unburned by 2050.82 The Middle East possesses over half of the unburnable 
oil globally (and half of unburnable global gas reserves) leaving over 260 billion barrels in 
the ground, almost 40 percent of its oil reserves,83 but with coal and production in other 
regions being phased out first. This is under the assumption that countries and consumers 
behave in an economically rational fashion.84 
Apart from costs, timing is important. The 1.5 °C ambition requires a decarbonisation of 
energy supply that is more rapid and profound than in 2 °C-consistent scenarios. Dietz et 
al. indicate that an energy-system transformation with about 50 percent additional decar-
bonisation compared to a 2 °C scenario is needed, starting sooner.85 Early CO2 reductions 
in 1.5 °C-consistent scenarios are achieved through early reductions in the power sector,86 
but by 2050 most of the supply-side mitigation potential is already used – also when aiming 
to keep warming to 2 °C. Moving to 1.5 °C relies on much stronger emission reductions on 
the end-use sectors such as industry and, in particular, transport and buildings,87 which are 
sectors consuming most oil. Again, this suggest there is some time left to adjust Kuwait’s 
economy to changes in oil demand, but with a 1.5 °C target, impacts will be felt sooner. 
81   Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, ‘The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when lim-
iting global warming to 2 °C’, Nature 517 (2015), p. 187.
82   Based on the scenarios significant carbon capture and storage (CCS). Assumptions on CCS determine 
total production, with the deployment of CCS permitting wider exploitation of the fossil fuel resource 
base on a global level. Due to low costs of production in the Middle East compared to other regions, 
fewer CCS seems to mostly affect other producers rather than a producing country like Kuwait (assum-
ing perfects markets). See McGlade and Ekins, ‘The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused 
when limiting global warming to 2 °C’.
83   Ibid.
84   Models used often assume optimal conditions, i.e. perfect markets. The fossil fuel sector is heavily 
subsided and might remain subsidised with countries interfering because of national security consid-
erations or protecting employment, which would undermine the assumption that Kuwait will not be 
affected in the short run by a reduced demand because of its cost advantage as other countries might 
protect their producers. 
85   Dietz et al., ‘The Economics of 1.5 °C Climate Change’.
86   Rogelj et al., ‘Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5 °C’.
87   Ibid.
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There will also be some synergies. Kuwait’s high energy use for cooling, being one of the 
hottest cities on earth,88 creates a vicious circle; higher average temperatures globally means 
more extreme and prolonged heatwaves in the Gulf region. This means more cooling and 
even more emissions, rising non-linearly due to lower efficiencies of air conditioning 
devices at high temperatures. As climate change mitigation will limit the expected rise in 
temperatures this will have a (modest) effect on domestic oil consumption. Renewable 
energy could play an increasing role in mitigating Kuwait’s own emissions, further reduc-
ing the costs of energy use. The potential for both solar and wind energy is high, which 
makes the renewable energy target of up to 15 percent of Kuwait’s electricity consumption 
needs by 2030 realistic and entirely achievable.89
Finally, climate change will have an impact on the amount of food produced elsewhere 
– e.g. in Australia’s grain belt or on rice production in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, affecting 
global food availability and prices. Not only gradual changes in production will matter, but 
also the volatility; major food price spikes in 2007–8 illustrate that even a perceived short-
age due to compounding climate impacts in multiple food producing regions can lead 
to strong responses in restrictions on trade with impacts on prices. Compared to poorer 
importing countries, e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa, Kuwait is still well endowed to buffer any 
shocks, but a lack of alternative sources of food production will keep it exposed. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
A comprehensive application of the water, energy and food nexus concept to Kuwait and 
the Gulf region has been lacking. Here, we explored the nexus for Kuwait, reviewing avail-
able literature and focussing on empirical data from the most widely used global and 
regional databases on the WEF sectors. 
At the domestic scale, WEF trade-offs are modest. Kuwait’s domestic nexus can be char-
acterised as ‘energy-dominated’. We find, like others in the Middle East and North Africa 
region, that while there are certainly issues of water scarcity, trade-offs between sectors 
at this level are relatively small because water scarcity limits agricultural production and 
surplus fossil fuel resources compensate through desalination and food trade. To manage 
increasing water demand, Kuwait should scale up its reuse of water in the oil sector, and 
implement tighter domestic water, energy and food consumption measures.
88   Thair Shaikh, ‘Kuwait swelters in 54C heat – what could be the highest temperature ever recorded 
on earth’, The Independent, 23 July 2016. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/mid-
dle-east/kuwait-swelters-record-breaking-54c-heatwave-weather-7152911.html (accessed 23 November 
2019); ‘WMO examines reported record temperature of 54 °C in Kuwait’, World Meteorological Organization, 
26 July 2016. Available at https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/wmo-examines-reported-record-tem-
perature-of-54%C2%B0c-kuwait (accessed 20 November 2019); Ruth Michaelson, ‘Kuwait’s inferno: 
how will the world‘s hottest city survive climate change?’, The Guardian, 18 August 2017. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/aug/18/kuwait-city-hottest-place-earth-climate-change-gulf-
oil-temperatures (accessed 24 November 2019).
89   ‘Renewable Energy Market Analysis: GCC 2019’, International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA (2019), 
p. 153.
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At the international scale, exports and imports highlight more significant nexus trade-
offs. Whilst its high oil export revenues shield Kuwait from the immediate impacts of 
higher prices, they do not fully buffer exposure to sudden export restrictions in export-
ing countries. Further analysis of the extent to which Kuwait and the GCC are exposed 
to water scarcity and food production risks in other countries, taking into account the 
increased likelihood of extreme events in a changing climate, is strongly recommended. 
At the global scale, uncertainty remains about future international climate policy and its 
implications for oil and gas revenues in Kuwait. Our exploratory analysis suggests that 
implementation of measures to account for the social cost of carbon would significantly 
impact export revenues. However, if a cap on total global emissions were introduced, 
taking a more constructive stance in global climate negotiations (rather than blocking 
initiatives such as the endorsement of the IPPC’s scientific ‘1.5 degrees Celsius’ report 
during COP24 in 2018) might actually benefit Kuwait; with its low production costs and 
existing infrastructure, its oil and gas could form an important part in any agreement on 
economically efficient use of the remaining carbon budget, while ruling out less economic 
reserves elsewhere. This might give the country more time to adapt its economic and 
governance models to a low carbon future. This would entail massive progress in climate 
negotiations and international policy; however, if this were achieved it might also prevent 
serious impacts in the regions where Kuwait’s food imports are sourced.
A better understanding of nexus trade-offs across these scales – both for Kuwait and the 
wider GCC – is essential to support strategic planning for water, energy and food security 
and economic diversification in today’s changing, highly interconnected, but potentially 
more protectionist world.
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